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SHOUTING FIRE IN A BURNING 
THEATER: DISTINGUISHING FOURTH 
ESTATE FROM FIFTH COLUMN IN THE 
AGE OF WIKILEAKS 
Kicked up from the seabed, the tsunami amplified in size and 
slowed in speed as it moved into the shallows beside the Jap-
anese coastline, and by the time it touched land it was a wall 
of water, black and smooth. It was as tall in places as a three-
story building, moving at fifty miles per hour. It flicked fish-
ing trawlers over seawalls, crunched them against bridges. It 
sent fleets of cars and trucks hurtling from parking lots, and 
turned homes into chips of wood and tile….1 
The revolutionary wave sweeping [the Arab world] shows 
that once the masses are mobilized, no force on earth can stop 
them . . . . If it can happen in Egypt, it can happen anywhere.
2
 
From what we‘ve read from overseas, if the Wikileaks release 
of classified documents could be recorded on an International 
Diplomatic Richter Scale, the measurement would be on par 
to a massive, catastrophic earthquake . . . .
3
 
By all measures, 2011 has already proven be a year of seismic 
ruptures both natural and political.  The tectonic earthquakes that de-
vastated Japan and New Zealand symbolize like nothing else the vio-
lent shocks to established patterns of domestic governance and inter-
national relations humanity has witnessed in recent months.  World 
attention has been focused first and foremost on North Africa and the 
Middle East, but the sheer magnitude of events in that region obscures 
  
 1 Evan Osnos, Aftershocks: A Nation Bears the Unbearable, NEW YORKER, 
Mar. 28, 2011, at 72, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/03/28/110328fa_fact_osnos#ixzz1H7H7b
A5K. 
 2 Alan Woods, Revolutionary Aftershocks, IN DEFENCE OF MARXISM (Feb. 
21, 2011), http://www.marxist.com/revolutionary-aftershocks.htm. 
 3 LBG1, Wikileaks Documents Release: ‗Political Meltdown For US For-
eign Policy, DEATH BY 1000 PAPERCUTS (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://deathby1000papercuts.com/2010/11/wikileaks-documents-release-political-
meltdown-for-us-foreign-policy/. 
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the countless smaller tremors rattling the political status quo in coun-
try after country across the globe.
4
 
Although the conditions giving rise to this turmoil surely vary, 
and each country‘s situation is in large part unique, the global eco-
nomic crisis‘ role in fueling political friction everywhere has not gone 
unnoticed.
5
 But there is a second common thread uniting today‘s tur-
bulent international headlines, and that is the seemingly ubiquitous 
presence of U.S. State Department cables containing classified com-
munications between American ambassadors and their diplomatic 
counterparts in foreign embassies.
6
 Australian-born anti-secrecy activ-
ist Julian Assange publicly disclosed files from a massive cache con-
taining 250,000 of such cables to five newspapers
7
through his website 
WikiLeaks on November 28, 2010
8
 after having received them from 
an anonymous source
9
 inside the government who had clearance to 
  
 4 See Eamon Quinn, Ireland's Governing Party Suffers Crushing Defeat In 
Wake Of Debt Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20110227-701722.html (describing how the Irish have voted the country‘s ruling 
party of eighty-five years out of power); Bolivians Stage Indefinite General Strike, 
BBC NEWS (May 10, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8672440.stm (Bolivia called 
for an ―indefinite general strike‖ after a week of riots and unrest); see also Nick Mi-
roff, Observers Call Haitian Runoff a Success, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tensions-high-at-haitian-
polls/2011/03/20/AByYjo1_story.html (―Haiti struggled once more to pull off an 
orderly election Sunday, as confusion broke out at polls and turnout appeared 
low…‖).  
 5 ―How many revolutions in history have been started over the price of 
bread?‖ one columnist for Esquire magazine rhetorically asked a week before Egypt‘s 
January 25 uprising when many doubted whether Tunisia‘s unrest would spread 
beyond its borders. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Who Should Worry About the Tunisia Fal-
lout, Really?, ESQUIRE, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/tunisia-
revolution-4924024#ixzz1H7uuM0TG. ―Are you kidding?‖ he answered, ―Virtually 
all of them. Re-read your Victor Hugo.‖ Id. (referring to Hugo‘s novel, Les 
Misérables). 
 6 See Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a Raw Look 
Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (describing cables which 
discuss Libya, North Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries in the news 
today). 
 7 The initial five newspapers with which Assange shared the cables were 
TheNew York Times, The Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, and El País. See U.S. 
Documents Obtained by WikiLeaks Posted Despite Site Problem, CNN (Nov. 29, 
2010, 5:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/28/wikileaks.attack/index.html. 
 8 See Shane & Lehren, supra note 6, at A1. 
 9 The Government suspects Private First Class Bradley Manning as the 
leaker and has held him at a Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia since the sum-
mer of 2010 before moving him to the military prison in Leavenworth, Kansas. See 
Brad Knickerbocker, Alleged ‗WikiLeaker‘ Bradley Manning Sent to Less Restrictive 
Prison, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0421/Alleged-WikiLeaker-Bradley-
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access them.
10
 Since then, Assange has been slowly releasing more 
and more such files day-by-day, week-by-week, and month-by-
month.
11
 The published cables have been credited with critically gal-
vanizing the revolutions in Tunisia,
12
 Egypt,
13
 and Libya
14
 and with 
fundamentally destabilizing governments everywhere else.
15
 
Examples of the cable‘s explosive worldwide political impact ab-
ound. India‘s ruling party was dealt a crushing blow on March 17, 
2011 when The Hindu published cables it has received from Wiki-
  
Manning-sent-to-less-restrictive-prison.Manning allegedly stored the cable-containing 
files on a Lady Gaga compact disc to smuggle them to Assange. See David Muir & 
Jessica Hopper, Who Is Pvt. Bradley Manning?, ABCNEWS (Jul. 26, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/wikileaks-case-pv-bradley-manningss-
allegedroleleaking/story?id=11254454. Assange claims to be suspicious of the Gov-
ernment‘s identification of Manning as the leaker, but considers Manning a ―hero‖ if 
he in fact is the leaker. Sam Jones, Julian Assange: Whoever Leaked US Embassy 
Cables is Unparalleled Hero, GUARDIAN (UK), Dec. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/dec/03/julian-assange-live-online-answers. 
Popular outrage over Manning‘s treatment at Quantico, which allegedly involved 
being forced to sleep naked, is widely cited as having prompted his transfer to Lea-
venworth. See Knickerbocker, supra.  
 10 WikiLeaks emphasizes the anonymous nature of its sources, and puts a 
great deal of effort into guaranteeing that anonymity. Submissions, WIKILEAKS, 
http://wikileaks.ch/Submissions.html (―Wikileaks does not record any source-
identifying information and there are a number of mechanisms in place to protect 
even the most sensitive submitted documents from being sourced.‖)(last visited May 
2, 2011). 
 11 Assange has so far released only around one percent of the entire cache of 
251,287 cables and continues to slowly release only a handful or two per day. Ra-
phael G. Satter, WikiLeaks: 1 Percent of Diplomatic Cables Published, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 23, 2011, available 
athttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/23/wikileaks-one-percent-cables-
published/. 
 12 See Andrew Sullivan, Tunisia‘s WikiLeaks Revolution, ATLANTIC (THE 
DAILY DISH) (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2011/01/tunisias-wikileaks-
revolution.html; see also Robert Mackey, Qaddafi Sees WikiLeaks Plot in Tunisia, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2011, 12:30 PM), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/qaddafi-sees-wikileaks-plot-in-tunisia/ 
(Libya‘s Muammar Gadhafi blamed WikiLeaks cables for Tunisia‘s unrest days after 
Tunisian president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee the country.). 
 13 See Gus Lubin, WikiLeaks Spurs On Protests By Releasing New Egypt 
Corruption Cables, BUSINESSINSIDER (Jan. 28, 2011, 5:15 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/wikileaks-egypt-brutality-2011-1. 
 14 See Scott Shane, WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family‘s Exploits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at A9, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/world/africa/23cables.html. 
 15 Assange himself has taken credit for helping the Arab uprisings through 
the release of certain cables. See Assange Claims Wikileaks Boosted Mid East Upris-
ings, BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-12758380. 
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Leaks substantiating long-standing allegations that in July 2008 it had 
bribed members of parliament to enter a vote of confidence on a nuc-
lear deal between India and the United States.
16
Cables obtained by 
Peru‘s leading newspaper El Comercio have seriously compromised 
the populist and nationalist credentials of multiple presidential candi-
dates weeks before the country‘s upcoming elections, portraying them 
as little more than American stooges masquerading as left-wing po-
pulists.
17
 The U.S. ambassador to Mexico resigned after a WikiLeaks 
cable was published that quoted him complaining of ―inefficiency and 
  
 16 See A. Srivathsan, Amar Singh Asked Manmohan and Sonia to Remove 
Chidambaram, Deora: 2008 Cable, HINDU (THE INDIA CABLES) (Apr. 23, 
2011),http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1718475.ece. 
 17 El Comercio Gets Huge Cache of Wikileaked Cables About Peru, 
PERUVIAN TIMES (Feb. 13, 2011),http://www.peruviantimes.com/13/el-comercio-gets-
huge-cache-of-wikileaked-cables-about-peru/10869/. The cables portray them reas-
suring U.S. diplomats of their willingness to contain popular social radicalism and 
acknowledging America‘s fear of ―indigenous power‖ in Peru, and pledging to sup-
port multinational mining interests in spite of their being unpopular among the Peru-
vian electorate. See also Wikileaks: Peru Officials Knew of Illegal Logging, 
HARDWOOD FLOORS (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://hardwoodfloorsmag.com/editors/blog/default.aspx?id=294&t=Wikileaks-Peru-
Officials-Knew-of-Illega (Cables show that Officials in Peru knew that 70 – 90 of the 
mahogany exported in 2005 where illegally felled.); Peru: WikiLeaks Impact seen on 
Elections, WORLD WAR 4 REP. (Feb. 28, 2011, 18:14 GMT), 
http://www.ww4report.com/node/9551 (―[T]he cables seem to indicate a US tilt to 
García‘s ruling Peruvian Aprista Party (PAP).‖); Marco Sánchez, WikiLeaks Make 
Peru Presidential Candidates ―Panic,‖ Says Analyst, LIVING IN PERU (Feb. 22, 2011, 
16:57 GMT), http://www.livinginperu.com/news/14210(―Ariel Segal is a historian, 
journalist and international analyst.He thinks that the disclosure of the WikiLeaks 
cables will make the electoral campaign more complicated.‖); Juan Arellano, Peru: 
Wikileaks and the Presidential Campaign, GLOBAL VOICES (Mar. 5, 2011, 22:01 
GMT), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/03/05/peru-wikileaks-usa-and-their-effect-
on-the-presidential-campaign/ (―Nowadays, Toledo participates in the U.S. interven-
tion in Peru. While Humala has separated from Chavez, Toledo has been widely 
recognized as the officially protected person, at least one, of the U.S. government.‖); 
Brenda Norrell, Wikileaks Peru: US Feared Indigenous Power, NARCOSPHERE (Feb. 
26, 2011, 8:53 PM), http://narcosphere.narconews.com/notebook/brenda-
norrell/2011/02/wikileaks-peru-us-feared-indigenous-power (―Wikileaks releases 
from Peru once again reveal the pro-copper mining and anti-Indigenous sentiment of 
the US Embassy in Lima.‖); Ángel Páez, Wikileaks Cables Reveal Two-Faced Poli-
tics by US, IPSNEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53887 
(―‗It‘s not surprising for the United States to cooperate with military or government 
officials in Peru about which it has information linking them to serious crimes,‘ said 
activist Ricardo Soberón, referring to contradictions revealed in cables released by the 
whistle-blowing website Wikileaks.‖). In fact, one cable implicated the Peruvian 
army in drug trafficking. InSight, WikiLeaks: Peruvian Army Connected to Drug 
Trafficking, UPSIDE DOWN WORLD (Dec. 15, 2010, 9:47 PM), 
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/peru-archives-76/2819-wikileaks-peruvian-army-
connected-to-drug-trafficking. 
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infighting among Mexican security forces in the campaign against 
drug cartels.‖18 Perhaps most disturbingly, a cable published by The 
Guardian on March 14, 2011 quotes a Japanese parliamentarian ac-
cusing Japan‘s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry—the agency 
that oversees nuclear energy—of ―covering up nuclear accidents, and 
obscuring the true costs and problems associated with the nuclear in-
dustry.‖19 
But American public officials have the most to fear from the exis-
tence of the cables and their constant, slow trickle, because U.S. dip-
lomacy is the hub through which each and every one of these scandals 
travels. To date, the world has learned from WikiLeaks that Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton ordered American diplomats to spy on the 
United Nations officials and obtain their ―DNA data—including iris 
scans and fingerprints—as well as credit card and frequent flier num-
bers,‖20 that President Obama has been fighting a ―secret war‖ in Ye-
men, ordering cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorists,
21
 and that 
the United States pressured Spain to stop investigating torture and 
rendition at Guantanamo Bay.
22
 We have also learned from Wiki-
Leaks that the ―Obama and Bush administrations repeatedly characte-
rized Bahrain as more open and reform-minded than its neighbors‖ 
and pushed back against human rights groups that have criticized the 
Bahrain government for the arrest of protesters and lawyers.
23
And 
further, that Omar Suleiman, the United States‘ preferred successor to 
  
 18 US Ambassador to Mexico Resigns Over WikiLeaks Embassy Cables, 
GUARDIAN (UK) (Mar. 20, 2011, 4:17 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
mar/20/us-ambassador-mexico-resigns-wikileaks. 
 19 US Embassy Cables: MP Criticizes Japanese Nuclear Strategy, GUARDIAN 
(UK) (Mar. 14, 2011, 17:22 GMT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-
cables-documents/175295. 
 20 Gerry Peev, How Hillary Clinton Ordered U.S. Diplomats to Spy on UN 
Leaders, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:02 
AM),http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1333920/WikiLeaks-Hillary-Clinton-
ordered-U-S-diplomats-spy-UN-leaders.html#ixzz1H8TzvUsr. 
 21 Josh Gerstein, WikiLeaks Sheds Light on Obama‘s Secret War, POLITICO 
(Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/1210/WikiLeaks_shed_light_on_Obamas
_secret_war.html. 
 22 Giles Tremlett, Wikileaks: US Pressured Spain Over CIA Rendition and 
Guantánamo Torture, GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 1, 2010),http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-us-spain-guantanamo-rendition. 
 23 Mark Landler, U.S. Offered Rosy View Before Bahrain Crackdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/middleeast/19diplomacy.html?pagewante
d=all. 
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ousted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, ruthlessly oversaw the 
horrific torture of detainees the CIA had ―rendered‖ to Egypt.24 
Senator Joe Lieberman, who has suggested prosecuting not only 
Assange but even the New York Times and other newspapers reporting 
on the cables,
25
may have been thinking about a certain recently-leaked 
cable dating to February 23, 2009 when he decided not to run for ree-
lection in 2012.
26The cable depicts him asking President Mubarak‘s 
hated investment-banker son and erstwhile heir apparent Gamal for 
his advice, as ―an experienced international financier,‖ on U.S. fiscal 
policy after the trillion-dollar Troubled Asset Relief Program
27
 failed 
to halt Wall Street‘s free fall.28 The younger Mubarak advised Lie-
berman to ―inject even more money into the system‖ and the senator 
―agreed on the need for bold measures to restore confidence.‖29 
Lieberman has been at the forefront of a bipartisan effort to extra-
dite and prosecute Assange
30
 from the day WikiLeaks first began pub-
  
 24 Mahmoud Abu Ghosh, Suleiman Helped CIA Torture Prisoners, INDY 
NEWS ISRAEL (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.indynewsisrael.com/suleiman-helped-cia-
torture-prisoners.  
 25 Jack Mirkinson, Joe Lieberman: New York Times Should be Investigated 
for Publishing WikiLeaks Cables, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2010, 2:20 
PM),http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/liebermantimescrimewikileaks_n_7
93293.html. 
 26 David M. Halbfinger, Lieberman Will Not Run for Re-election, N.Y. 
TIMES CITY ROOM (Jan. 18, 2011, 5:27 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/lieberman-will-not-run-for-re-
election/. 
 27 Nelly Avila Moreno, Gamal Mubarak Talks to Joe Lieberman – Wikileaks, 
PROPAGANDA PRESS! FREEDOM NOW GUYANA (JAN. 29, 2011), 
http://propagandapress.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/gamal-mubarak-talks-to-joe-
lieberman-wikileaks/. The total cost to U.S. taxpayers of TARP, by some estimates, 
exceeded ―the total combined costs in today‘s dollars of the Marshall Plan, the Loui-
siana Purchase, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the entire historical budget of 
NASA, including the moon landing….‖ See Russell Goldman, Financial Bailout 
Balloons to the Trillions, ABCNEWS (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6332892&page=1. 
 28 Moreno, supra note 27. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Mirkinson, supra note 25. Attorney General Eric Holder launched a crimi-
nal investigation of Assange and WikiLeaks soon after the release of the cables, and 
vowed to hold ―accountable‖ and ―responsible‖ ―anybody who was involved in the 
breaking of American law….‖ Pete Yost, Holder Says WikiLeaks Under Criminal 
Investigation, ABCNEWS (Nov. 29, 
2010),http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wiresStory?id=12266154. He offered, however, 
―little in the way of specifics about the American legal strategy . . . .‖ Justin Elliott, 
Holder Threatens WikiLeaks, Again, SALON (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/12/06/holder_on_assange_again. 
The question of what U.S. law Assange may have violated is and will remain specula-
tive unless and until the American government successfully manages to secure his 
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lishing the cables.
31
 He and Representative Peter King have sought to 
broaden the scope of Section 798
32
 of the Espionage Act of 1917
33
 to 
cover non-state ―transnational threat[s]‖ such as WikiLeaks.34 The 
  
extradition to the United States. See Greg Barns, Assange Extradition Fears are Real, 
AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/44710.html 
(examining how under Swedish law Assange may be turned over to the Americans). 
 31 Lieberman‘s role as chairman of the Homeland Security Committee has 
given him the opportunity to bring the power of the federal government to bear 
against WikiLeaks in ways that go beyond legislative measures and include coercing 
private companies like Amazon.com and PayPal to cease doing business with As-
sange and WikiLeaks. Alan Greenblatt, WikiLeaks Fallout: Unease Over Web Press 
Freedoms, NPR (Dec. 8, 2010),http://www.npr.org/2010/12/08/131905226/wikileaks-
fallout-unease-over-web-press-freedoms. 
 32 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2006). 
 33 §§ 791-98, 2388. 
 34 The current Section 798 reads in part: 
(a)Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise 
makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner pre-
judicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign 
government to the detriment of the United States any classified information—  
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryp-
tographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or  
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any 
device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the 
United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communica-
tion intelligence purposes; or  
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United 
States or any foreign government; or  
(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the com-
munications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been ob-
tained by such processes—  
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.  
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section—  
 
The term ―classified information‖ means information which, at the time of a 
violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically des-
ignated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dis-
semination or distribution;  
 
The terms ―code,‖ ―cipher,‖ and ―cryptographic system‖ include in their 
meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing 
and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of 
disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of commu-
nications;  
 
The term ―foreign government‖ includes in its meaning any person or per-
sons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, de-
partment, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, 
or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting 
to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such gov-
ernment is recognized by the United States;  
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government favors an interpretation of the Act more generally that 
subjects to criminal liability not only government employees who leak 
classified information they are cleared to access but also third party 
recipients of that information who publish it—the category under 
which Assange and WikiLeaks fall—provided the latter‘s intent to 
harm national security can be proven.
35
 
Senator Dianne Feinstein popularized the idea of prosecuting As-
sange and WikiLeaks under the Espionage Act soon after the initial 
release of the cables,
36
 evoking Justice Holmes‘s well-known analogy 
  
 
The term ―communication intelligence‖ means all procedures and methods 
used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information 
from such communications by other than the intended recipients;  
 
The term ―unauthorized person‖ means any person who, or agency which, 
is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsec-
tion (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head of a department or 
agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by 
the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the 
United States.  
 
§ 798. The Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination 
(―SHIELD‖) Act would add ―or transnational threat‖ to Section 798(a)(1) and would 
insert the two new subsections, ―(4) concerning the human intelligence activities of 
the United States or any foreign government‖ and ―(5) concerning the identity of a 
classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the 
United States[,]‖ to Section 798(a). See S.315, 112th Cong. (2011). The Act would 
define ―human intelligence‖ as ―all procedures and methods employed in the collec-
tion of intelligence through human sources‖ and would define ―transnational threat‖ 
as follows:  
(A) any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the deli-
very systems for such weapons, and organized crime that threatens the na-
tional security of the United States; or 
(B) any individual or group that engages in an activity referred to in subpa-
ragraph (A). 
See id. The Act would define the terms ―informant‖ and ―intelligence community‖ as 
they are currently defined in the National Security Act of 1947. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 401(a), 426 (2006)). 
 35 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RES. SERV., CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE 
PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION11 (rev. ed. 2011), available 
athttp://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41404.pdf (―[I]t seems that there is ample 
statutory authority for prosecuting individuals who elicit or disseminate many of the 
documents at issue, as long as the intent element can be satisfied and potential dam-
age to national security can be demonstrated.‖). 
 36 See Dianne Feinstein, Prosecute Assange Under the Espionage Act: Just 
as the First Amendment is not a License to Yell ‗Fire!‘ in a Crowded Theater, it is 
also not a License to Jeopardize National Security, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2010), 
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in Schenck v. United States:
37
 ―Just as the First Amendment is not a 
license to yell ‗Fire!‘ in a crowded theater,‖ she claimed, ―it is also 
not a license to jeopardize national security.‖38 But Feinstein omitted a 
small detail in her paraphrase of Holmes that is actually highly rele-
vant in the WikiLeaks context. Holmes wrote of ―a man . . . falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.‖39 As much of a panic 
Assange‘s release of the WikiLeaks cables has surely caused among 
the world‘s governing classes, the cables all contain content that is 
nothing if not true. That is not to say, of course, that each and every 
one of the documents contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth.
40
 Among of the most scandalous, controversial, and 
widely discussed cables are those that reveal one world leader‘s opi-
nion of another world leader
41
 or an ambassador‘s frank and uncen-
sored, subjective assessment of a country‘s political situation.42The 
veracity of these documents is rather a product of manner in which 
they were produced, hidden from public view, and subsequently re-
vealed. WikiLeaks ―accepts a range of material but . . . [does] not 
solicit it‖ and provides a high security anonymous drop box fortified 
  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575653280626335258.ht
ml.  
 37 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 38 Feinstein, supra note 36. 
 39 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). 
 40 When computer security firm HB Gary conspired with Bank of America 
and several other ―top online security firms‖ to ―destroy WikiLeaks,‖ one of their 
primary strategies was ―planting fake documents with the group and then attacking 
them when published.‖ Glenn Greenwald, The Leaked Campaign to Attack WikiLeaks 
and Its Supporters, SALON (Feb. 11, 2011, 4:12 ET), 
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2011/02/11/campaigns. The 
unique authenticity and hence credibility of the documents is one of the most threat-
ening aspects of WikiLeaks in the opinion of those who have both power and some-
thing to hide. 
 41 See Chidanand Rajghatta, US Diplomats Called Putin ‗Alpha-Dog‘, Ger-
man Chancellor ‗Teflon Merkel‘, TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 29, 2010, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-11-29/us/28233746_1_cables-
allegations-narcotics. 
 42 The disclosure of the American ambassadors‘ unvarnished opinions about 
the decadent lifestyles of certain countries‘ ruling families in leaked cables has been 
widely credited with fomenting or fueling revolutions within those countries. See, 
e.g., US Embassy Cables: The ‗OTT‘ Lifestyle of Tunisian President‘s Son-in-Law, 
Including Pet Tiger, GUARDIAN (UK) (Dec. 7, 2010, 21:29 GMT), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/218324 (discussing 
the cable regarding the Ambassador‘s dinner with Al Materi (Ben Ali‘s son-in-law) 
and his lavish life style); Theunis Bates, The WikiLeaks Guide to the Gadhafi Clan, 
AOLNEWS (Feb. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/02/23/the-
wikileaks-guide-to-the gadhafi-clan/ (discussing the various lifestyles of Libyan dicta-
tor Moammar Gadhafi‘s children). 
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by cutting-edge cryptographic information technologies.
43
 The organi-
zation‘s journalistic staff ―asses[es] the submission. If it meets the 
criteria, our journalists then write or produce a news piece based on 
the document.‖44 It then publishes both a news story highlighting the 
most interesting parts and an analysis of the document along with the 
document itself.
45
 
As proof of  ―the truth of the matter asserted‖46 within it, each ca-
ble is mere hearsay—a ―drip‖ that rarely causes more than a ripple in 
the political waters of a nation.
47
This hearsay quality of individual 
cables is what those who claim their release ―reveals little more than 
gossip on the embassy circuit‖ have in mind.48 But as cumulative evi-
dence of a hidden ―international state system based on realpolitik, 
cynicism and cold self-interest, in which moral calculations are con-
spicuously absent,‖49 the cables in their totality have overrun the calm 
harbors of diplomatic trust between sovereign governments and 
smashed into those governments‘ edifices of democratic legitimacy 
with tsunami-like force.
50
 
The colossal volume of state-secret-containing digital files in As-
sange‘s possession and the utter futility of suppressing public know-
ledge of their contents after WikiLeaks releases them to an Internet-
wired world are both products of a revolution in communications 
technology that has fundamentally shifted political power from rulers 
to the ruled. In our current age, the monetary costs of obtaining, re-
  
 43 Submissions, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/Submissions.html (last vi-
sited May 2, 2011). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 47 See Caroline Arnold, The Disruptive Drip of WikiLeaks and the Public‘s 
Right to Know, COMMONDREAMS (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.commondreams.org/ 
view/2011/01/09-2. 
 48 Andrew Bolt, Wiki Cables Are Low-Rent Gossip, with no Top-Secret Reve-
lations, HERALD SUN (Melbourne), Dec. 1, 2010, at 30, available at 
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/opinion-old/leaked-wikileak-diplomatic-cables-are-
low-rent-gossip/story-e6frfifx-1225963581880. 
 49 Matthew Carr, Why Persecuting Bradley Manning is a Futile Gesture: 
Whistleblowers Have an Important Part to Play in Democratic Societies—has Obama 
Himself Has Said, FIRST POST (UK) (Mar. 7, 2011, 7:20 AM), 
http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/75979,news-comment,news-politics,why-persecuting-
bradley-manning-is-a-futile-gesture-wikileaks-assange#ixzz1GQqBMVRS. 
 50 Conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks writes of a ―world 
order‖ that ―is tenuously maintained by brave soldiers but also by talkative leaders 
and diplomats,‖ a ―fragile international conversation‖ to which Assange‘s ―old-
fashioned anarchist‖ mindset and agenda poses an existential threat. See David 
Brooks, Op-Ed., The Fragile Community, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A31, availa-
ble athttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/opinion/30brooks.html. 
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producing, and disseminating information reduce to zero, the ability to 
do so anonymously is without historical precedent, and the social and 
legal consequences of doing so illicitly is thus substantially dimi-
nished.
51
 The sheer power of the individual under such circumstances 
seems destined to overtake traditional debates about the rights of the 
individual.
52
 Only in such a world does Professor Geoffrey Stone‘s 
reference to ―the problem [that] arises when the public disclosure of 
secret information is both harmful to the national security and valua-
ble to self-governance‖ make any sense.53 
The evolving judicial doctrine that has accompanied the First 
Amendment since the aftermath of World War I is ill equipped to 
cope with the brave new world of WikiLeaks. It too has been engulfed 
by the tidal wave of political truth the cables have set in motion. The 
uproar over ―prior restraint‖ that followed President Nixon‘s attempt 
to enjoin the New York Times from publishing Daniel Ellsberg‘s Pen-
tagon Papers
54
 appears in hindsight almost medieval given the ease 
  
 51 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin,The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 
36PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009) (discussing the effect of the new technology reality on 
First amendment law and how network neutrality will affect future information poli-
cy); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (2008) (discussing the constitutionality of NSA‘s eavesdropping outside of 
FISA); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Free-
dom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing 
that digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech and therefore should 
change the focus of free speech theory). 
 52 For a thorough treatment of the havoc that the information revolution has 
wreaked on traditional conceptions of individual rights, see generally DAVID BRIN, 
THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN 
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (forecasting that information technology in the twen-
ty-first century will be a double-edged sword, forcing much greater public transparen-
cy while at the same time eroding individual privacy). 
 53 The Espionage Act and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by 
WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2010) 
[hereinafter WikiLeaks Hearing] (Statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago). 
 54 Ellsberg was ―a high-level Pentagon official‖ and considered his role in 
leaking the documents to the Times to be roughly analogous to Bradley Manning‘s 
alleged leak of the embassy cables to Julian Assange. Ashley Fantz, Pentagon Papers 
Leaker: ‗I was Bradley Manning,‘ CNN (Mar. 19, 2011),http://articles.cnn.com/2011-
03-19/us/wikileaks.ellsberg.manning_1_daniel-ellsberg-pentagon-papers-young-
man?_s=PM:US. The Pentagon Papers were 7,000 top-secret documents that showed 
that American leaders knew the ―Vietnam War was an unwinnable, tragic quagmire.‖ 
Id. In considering the leak, the Supreme Court denied Nixon his injunction in New 
York Times v. United States holding that ―[a]ny system of prior restraints of expres-
sion [bears] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.‖ N.Y. Times Co. 
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). Ellsberg, meanwhile, was tried under the Espio-
nage Act, but ―a number of bizarre twists‖ in the course of Ellsberg‘s 1973 trial re-
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with which any individual can anonymously upload classified infor-
mation to the Internet and the ease, in turn, with which that informa-
tion can suddenly ―go viral.‖55 The only recourse the current adminis-
tration has against WikiLeaks that is at all feasible today is a post-
publication criminal indictment.
56
The only way to prevent the Wiki-
Leaks exception from swallowing the norm of a free press is to distin-
guish Assange‘s peculiar trade from proper ―journalism‖ and to dis-
tinguish WikiLeaks from ―the press.‖57 Those who are interested in 
squaring the First Amendment circle in order to ―constitutionally‖ 
bring down Assange and his organization invariably settle on the pub-
  
sulted in the dismissal of all charges against him. See Judge William Byrne; Ended 
Trial Over Pentagon Papers, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2006, at C09, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/14/AR2006011401165.html. These ―bizarre twists‖ in-
volved improprieties by the very same Nixon administration operatives whose Water-
gate hotel break-in ended Nixon‘s presidency prematurely. Id. They included ―a dis-
closure by the government prosecutor that White House operatives had burglarized 
the Beverly Hills office of Ellsberg‘s psychiatrist‖ and various illegal wiretapping 
revelations. Id. The trial judge ultimately declared that ―[t]he totality of the circums-
tances of this case . . . offend a sense of justice‖ and ―have incurably infected [its] 
prosecution‖ and therefore dismissed the case entirely. Id. 
 55 ―To go viral‖ originated as a marketing term during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s as the Internet was first blossoming into a commercial space. See, e.g., 
Alan L. Montgomery, Applying Quantitative Marketing Techniques to the Internet, 31 
INTERFACES 90, 93 (2001). The advent several years later of social media platforms, 
however, shifted the usage of the term away from the corporate boardroom and into 
the living rooms of ordinary individuals, each of whom could potentially share an 
idea with the online community that would strike a popular nerve and spread from 
computer to computer with the speed of a mouse click. See generally, e.g., PATRICIA 
MARTIN, TIPPING THE CULTURE: HOW ENGAGING MILLENNIALS WILL CHANGE THINGS 
(2010). The disputed but still palpable role of social media in fueling social unrest in 
the Arab world and elsewhere in recent months has more thoroughly shifted ―going 
viral‖ from the commercial to the political sphere and arguably gave it a newly anti-
commercial character. See, e.g., Allison R. Soule, Fighting the Social Media Wildfire: 
How Crisis Communication Must Adapt to Prevent from Fanning the Flames (2010) 
(unpublished Masters of Journalism thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill), available at http://rightsideofright.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/Soule_Thesis_UBGwebsite.pdf. 
 56 Not everybody would consider post-publication prosecution to be much 
more feasible than prior restraint. See Jeremy Kinsman, Truth and Consequence: The 
WikiLeaks Saga, POLICY OPTIONS (Feb. 
2011),http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/feb11/kinsman.pdf. 
 57 Senator John Ensign has made just such a distinction. See Steve Rendall, 
WikiLeaks Not a Whistleblower, Assange Not a Journalist?, FAIR (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.fair.org/blog/2010/12/03/wikileaks-not-a-whistleblower-assange-not-a-
journalist/. 
2002] SHOUTING FIRE IN A BURNING THEATER 129 
lisher‘s specific intent ―to cause harm to the national security of the 
United States and/or benefit to a foreign power.‖58 
This specific intent standard for criminal third-party publisher lia-
bility under the Espionage Act collapses into mangled rubble the care-
fully compartmentalized distinction between, on the one hand, the 
executive branch‘s prerogative to classify documents as secret and 
maintain their secrecy for national security reasons,
59
 and on the other 
hand, the constitutional prohibition of Congress from making any law 
―abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.‖60 The Court has long appreciated the symbiotic 
relationship between education and advocacy in its First Amendment 
jurisprudence; for decades it has recognized that ―[t]he right to ex-
press viewpoints would mean little if government could stifle the ex-
change of facts underlying such viewpoints.‖61 The theory under 
which the government might attempt an Espionage prosecution of 
Assange and WikiLeaks would change this standard such that the 
government could constitutionally stifle the exchange of facts if it 
  
 58 WikiLeaks Hearing, supra note 53, at 68 (Statement of Stephen I. Vladeck, 
Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law). 
 59 The Pentagon Papers Case does not fall under this category because it 
concerned the issue of a prior injunction against publishing classified material, not a 
post-publication prosecution under the Espionage Act or another statute. There is very 
little precedent involving prosecutions for leaks of classified information with an 
intent to publish for the whole world to see as opposed to an intent merely to share 
with an enemy state, as with classic espionage. Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Informa-
tion Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 899 (2008). The most notable 
cases include United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 (4th Cir. 1988) (uphold-
ing conviction under Espionage Act of U.S. Naval Intelligence employee‘s leaking of 
satellite photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to a British magazine in violation of a 
nondisclosure agreement he had signed) and United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192, 
194 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming conviction under Espionage act of two lobbyists for 
―obtain[ing] national defense information from various sources within the United 
States government and unlawfully pass[ing] that information to other [lobbyists], 
foreign officials, and members of the news media.‖). 
 60 U.S. CONST. Amend. I, cl. 3-6. See, e.g., Bartnickiv. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 533-34 (2001) (stating unambiguously that disclosing or publishing information 
is speech and not ―conduct‖ and describing the disclosure of ―truthful information of 
public concern‖ as implicating ―the core purposes of the First Amendment‖); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (overturning an Alabama law restricting 
picketing during labor disputes and citing ―the public need for information and educa-
tion with respect to the significant issues of the times‖); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (holding that primary purpose of the First Amendment‘s 
Free Press Clause is ―to preserve an untrammeled press as a vital source of public 
information‖ and describing ―informed public opinion‖ as ―the most potent of all 
restraints upon misgovernment‖).  
 61 Kitrosser, supra note 59, at 906-07. 
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could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the exchanger of facts 
intended to harm national security. 
The philosophical conundrum of defining national security in a 
democracy, a political system in which the people in theory are self-
governing sovereigns,
62
 suddenly resurfaces after nearly a century of 
efforts by Justice Holmes, Justice Black, Alexander Mieklejohn, and 
others to bury it.
63
 The ―clear and present danger‖ analysis that has 
shaped First Amendment doctrine in the twentieth century emerged 
out of the wartime contradiction between individual liberal freedoms 
and collective republican loyalty that the same Espionage Act of 1917 
that the government currently wants to use against Assange.
64
 But the 
  
 62 Popular sovereignty was an idea that in Europe entailed a conceptual trans-
ference from the person of the royal prerogative of the absolute monarch to the ―gen-
eral will‖ of the ―constituent power.‖ The philosophical alienation between sovereign-
ty and the rule of law is a theme that eternally polarizing and controversial German 
jurist Carl Schmitt explored during the politically turbulent years of the Weimar Re-
public. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT 
OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005). The United 
States, however, never had a king, and the American understanding of popular sove-
reignty has always been looser and less defined than in Europe. See CHRISTIAN G. 
FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008); Carl J. Friedrich, The Deification of the 
State, 1 REV. POL. 18 (1939). 
 63 Holmes repudiated the ―meager clear and present danger test formulated 
in‖ Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), in favor of the ―imminent threat 
test‖ he applied in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). RONALD K.L. 
COLLINS & SAM CHALTAIN, WE MUST NOT BE AFRAID TO BE FREE: STORIES OF FREE 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 112 (2011). The imminent threat test was more context 
dependent and therefore de-emphasized the actual content of the defendant‘s speech. 
Black and MiekleJohn took a broader, more philosophical approach to the First 
Amendment and considered in the general context of democratic self-government and 
popular sovereignty. See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 
879 (1960), noting: Misuse of government power, particularly in times of stress, has 
brought suffering to humanity in all ages about which we have authentic history. 
Some of the world‘s noblest and finest men have suffered ignominy and death for no 
crime—unless unorthodoxy is a crime. Even enlightened Athens had its victims such 
as Socrates. Because of the same kind of bigotry, Jesus, the great Dissenter, was put 
to death on a wooden cross. The flames of inquisitions all over the world have warned 
that men endowed with unlimited government power, even earnest men, consecrated 
to a cause, are dangerous. See also Alexander Mieklejohn, The First Amendment is 
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (―The First Amendment does not protect a 
‗freedom to speak.‘ It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and commu-
nication by which we ‗govern.‘ It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a 
public power, a governmental responsibility.‖). 
 64 Both Holmes‘s ―clear and present danger‖ test in Schenck and his ―immi-
nent threat‖ test in Abrams concern the particular exigencies of the World War I home 
front. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (―When a nation is at war many things that might 
be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not 
be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by 
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formative free speech decisions of that era for the most part focused 
not on the publication of classified information but on the advocacy of 
resistance to and obstruction of America‘s war effort. Title 1, Section 
3 of the original 1917 act read: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully 
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to 
interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its 
enemies,…and whoever, when the United States is at war, 
shall willfully cause, or attempt to cause . . . insubordination, 
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct…the re-
cruiting or enlistment service of the United States,…shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than twenty years, or both . . . .
65
 
Schenck v.United States,
66
 the source of Holmes‘s ―fire‖ quote, con-
cerned this 1917 language.
67
 But the following year, Congress 
amended the Espionage Act in what became known as the Sedition 
Act of 1918.
68
 The language of Section 3 was expanded so as to cover 
  
any constitutional right.‖). If the Government in its prosecution of Assange were to 
extend the post-9/11 War on Terror idea of a global battlefield and an indefinite con-
flict, then there would be presumably no limit to the extent to which ―unorthodoxy,‖ 
as Justice Black might put it, could be constitutionally criminalized. 
 65 See WALTER NELLES, ED., NAT‘L CIV. LIBERTIES BUR., ESPIONAGE ACT 
CASES WITH CERTAIN OTHERS ON RELATED POINTS: NEW LAW IN MAKING AS TO 
CRIMINAL UTTERANCE IN WAR-TIME 1-2 (1918). 
 66 Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 67 See id. at 53 (―The fact that the Act of 1917 was enlarged by the amending 
Act of May 16, 1918, of course, does not affect the present indictment and would not, 
even if the former act had been repealed.‖) (citation omitted); see also RICHARD 
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE 
SPEECH 367 (1987) (noting that the repeal of the 1918 Sedition Act in 1921 meant that 
―the law which had produced Schenck remained on the books, but not the law which 
had produced Abrams.‖). 
 68 For some historical context regarding the manner in which the Espionage 
and Sedition Acts were debated and enacted, see generally Stephen M. Feldman, Free 
Speech, World War I, and Republican Democracy: The Internal and External 
Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192 (2008); Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned 
Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335 
(2003) (claiming that the repressive effect attributed to the Espionage Act was more 
judicial construction than legislative intent). For some scholarly perspective from the 
period, see Thomas F. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War Time: The 
Espionage Act, 17MICH. L. REV. 621 (1919); Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech 
and Press Under the First Amendment: A Resume, 30 YALE L. J. 48 (1920); John B. 
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whole categories of political advocacy speech that had been un-
touched by the original 1917 language: 
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully 
make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to 
interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval 
forces of the United States or to promote the success of its 
enemies, or shall willfully make or convey false reports or 
false statements, or say or do anything except by way of bona 
fide and not disloyal advice to an investor . . . with intent to 
obstruct the sale by the United States of bonds . . . or the mak-
ing of loans by or to the United States, or whoever, when the 
United States is at war, shall willfully cause . . . or incite . . . 
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the 
military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully 
obstruct . . . the recruiting or enlistment service of the United 
States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall 
willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, 
scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government 
of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, 
or the military or naval forces of the United States, or the flag 
. . . or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, 
or any language intended to bring the form of government . . . 
or the Constitution . . . or the military or naval forces . . . or 
the flag . . . of the United States into contempt, scorn, con-
tumely, or disrepute . . . or shall willfully display the flag of 
any foreign enemy, or shall willfully . . . urge, incite, or advo-
cate any curtailment of production in this country of any thing 
or things . . . necessary or essential to the prosecution of the 
war . . . and whoever shall willfully advocate, teach, defend, 
or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section 
enumerated and whoever shall by word or act support or favor 
the cause of any country with which the United States is at 
war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States 
therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both . . . 
.
69
 
To Title XII of the Act, moreover, was added a provision which in the 
current WikiLeaks age would be absurdly futile, empowering direct 
  
Stanchfield, The Peril of Espionage, 203 N. AM. REV. 830 (1916); M.G. Wallace, 
Constitutionality of Sedition Laws, 6 VA. L. REV. 385 (1920). 
 69 NELLES, supra note 65, at 1-2. 
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government interference with the circulation of offending publications 
through the mails: 
When the United States is at war, the Postmaster General 
may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or 
concern is using the mails in violation of . . . this Act, instruct 
the postmaster at any post office at which mail is received ad-
dressed to such person or concern to return to the postmaster 
at the office at which they were originally mailed all letters or 
other matter so addressed, with the words ‗Mail to this ad-
dress undeliverable under Espionage Act‘ plainly written or 
stamped upon the outside thereof, and all such letters or other 
matter so returned to such postmasters shall be by them re-
turned to the senders thereof under such regulations as the 
Postmaster General may prescribe.
70
 
Finally, the Attorney General issued the following statement to federal 
prosecutors regarding the importance of proving disloyal intent when 
prosecuting speakers under the expanded Act: 
The prompt and aggressive enforcement of this Act is of the 
highest importance in suppressing disloyal utterances and 
preventing breaches of peace. It is also of great importance 
that this statute be administered with discretion. It should not 
be permitted to become the medium whereby efforts are made 
to suppress honest, legitimate criticism of the administration 
or discussion of government policies; nor should it be permit-
ted to become a medium for personal feuds or persecution. 
The wide scope of the Act and powers conferred increase the 
importance of discretion in administering it. Protection of 
loyal persons from unjust suspicion and prosecution is quite 
as important as the suppression of actual disloyalty.
71
 
The evolution of the Court‘s First Amendment doctrine from the deci-
sions that arose out of prosecutions under this Act
72
 to the modern 
principle requiring imminent harm to national security interests is 
required before political speech can be restricted
73
 was defined by the 
  
 70 Id. at 2. 
 71 Id. at 2-3. 
 72 The trilogy of cases typically credited with initiating the Court‘s modern 
First Amendment doctrine are Schenck v. United States,249 U.S. 47 (1919), Froh-
werk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 
(1919). 
 73 Traditionally, the requirement of imminent harm to national security made 
possible a clear distinction between political advocacy (and informative) speech, 
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slow, if uneven, divergence between radical political advocacy (and 
the facts underlying such advocacy) per se
74—and the national securi-
ty exception to the First Amendment.
75
 
The WikiLeaks cable disclosures inflict upon Washington with 
the same seismic force as they do upon its allies and enemies ―the 
embarrassment of having their corrupt, war-mongering ways pub-
lished for all the world to see‖ and sitting in the front row of this thea-
ter of political voyeurism is ―an increasingly restless and volatile elec-
torate.‖76 Under such circumstances, the distinction between disloyal 
  
which is constitutionally protected under the strictest of scrutiny standards, see Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969)(―[T]he constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use 
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.‖), 
and security-compromising conduct, such as leaking classified information, see New 
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (―The dominant purpose of 
the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental sup-
pression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First 
Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious 
libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-
be. The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration 
of that principle. A debate of large proportions goes on in the Nation over our posture 
in Vietnam. That debate antedated the disclosure of the contents of the present docu-
ments. The latter are highly relevant to the debate in progress.‖) (citations omitted). 
 74 During World War I, prosecutors and appellate judges often did not sym-
pathize with the defendant‘s insistence on the truth of his utterance. See United States 
v. Motion Picture Film ‗The Spirit of ‗76‘, 252 F. 946 (S.D. Cal. 1917) (finding de-
fendant filmmaker guilty under the Espionage Act for maligning the government of 
the UK, America‘s wartime ally, by producing a film about the American War of 
Independence that depicted eighteenth-century British Redcoats committing atrocities 
against American colonists). See id. at 947 (―History is history, and fact is fact. There 
is no doubt about that. At the present time, however, the United States is confronted 
with what I conceive to be the greatest emergency we have ever been confronted with 
at any time in our history. There is now required of us the greatest amount of devotion 
to a common cause, the greatest amount of co-operation, the greatest amount of effi-
ciency, and the greatest amount of disposition to further the ultimate success of Amer-
ican arms that can be conceived, and as a necessary consequence no man should be 
permitted, by deliberate act, or even unthinkingly, to do that which will in any way 
detract from the efforts which the United States is putting forth or serve to postpone 
for a single moment the early coming of the day when the success of our arms shall 
be a fact and the righteousness of our cause shall have been demonstrated.‖). 
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sedition and loyal criticism that the U.S. Attorney General in 1918 
advised his subordinates to honor is even less meaningful than it was 
during World War I. Under the specific intent standard of Espionage 
Act liability with which the Government wants to prosecute Assange 
and WikiLeaks, a trial jury could very well end up convicting or ac-
quitting based on its assessment of a prosecutor‘s closing argument 
worded identically to the following assertion by The National Re-
view‘s Rich Lowry: 
Assange‘s goal is wanton destruction, pure and simple. He 
wants to expose to retribution those who cooperate with us on 
the ground in war zones. He wants to undercut domestic sup-
port for our wars. He wants to embarrass our foreign allies 
and exact a price for their trust in us. He wants to complicate 
sensitive operations like securing nuclear material in Pakistan 
and attacking terrorists with missiles in Yemen. Assange is 
Noam Chomsky with a knack for computers and a determina-
tion to do the ―American empire‖ more harm than just lashing 
out against it in feverish books gobbled up by college sopho-
mores.
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As the current century progresses, more and more of us will develop a 
sufficient ―knack for computers‖ to be able to inflict the type of politi-
cal damage Assange has inflicted by releasing the cables. If technolo-
gical savvy is all that is necessary to make a federal felon out of every 
questioning soul who dares follow in the footsteps of the kindly old 
MIT linguistics professor with a political chip on his shoulder, there 
will be little of substance left of the First Amendment before long. 
Geoffrey Schotter
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